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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BEYOND THE TIDE:
BEGINNING ADMIRALTY WITH THE STEAMBOAT MAGNOLIA
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
Admiralty is potentially one of the richest subjects in the law school
curriculum. This claim may be received skeptically by those who have neither
taught nor taken the course. Yet my experience as a student in, and teacher of,
the course confirms my belief that Admiralty holds that promise, especially if
it is presented not simply as a vehicle to train the relatively few who hope to
become maritime lawyers, but as an opportunity for students with different
aspirations to explore some of the most interesting issues in law. As a
crosscutting course, Admiralty offers a chance to integrate materials and
concepts from other classes, including civil procedure, torts, contracts,
property, constitutional law, choice of law, and federal courts. It offers a
comparative lens through which to view rules and principles in land law and
accordingly achieve a better understanding of doctrine explored in earlier
courses. And it provides a venue to consider, in an admiralty context, some of
the most interesting questions that arise across the curriculum.1
I first reached this surprising conclusion regarding the reach and richness
of the subject when I took Admiralty in law school from Professor Donald T.
Trautman. He was not an admiralty specialist, but was a leading scholar of
conflicts of law with a strong interest in federal common law. He taught
Admiralty in the manner here recommended, a statement which inverts cause
and effect since his presentation influenced the way I later taught the course,
first as an adjunct professor for four years at Washington University School of
Law beginning in 1990 while practicing admiralty law, and later at Saint Louis
University School of Law when I joined this faculty. The merit of that vision
was confirmed each time I taught the subject.

* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Colin
Luoma for exemplary research assistance. I alone am responsible for the views and shortcomings
of this essay.
1. See Joel K. Goldstein, Reconceptualizing Admiralty: A Pedagogical Approach, 29 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 625, 631–35 (1998).
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The Steamboat Magnolia2 was the first case I studied in Professor
Trautman’s admiralty class and the first case I have always covered whenever I
have taught Admiralty. Until the most recent edition,3 Jo Desha Lucas’
admiralty casebook always included a gently edited version,4 and it was there I
first encountered the case, as a student and then as a teacher. To my
disappointment, the casebook I co-authored does not include the case,
reflecting a choice of some of my eminent co-authors.5 They presented instead
The Genesee Chief,6 a practice that some other leading casebooks also follow.7
The Genesee Chief, also a rich case, preceded The Steamboat Magnolia, which
relied on Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion.8 But The Steamboat
Magnolia includes two lengthy and impassioned dissents and, in my view, for
the reasons stated below is a better teaching tool. Accordingly, I supplement
the materials our fine book contains by providing the students with a copy of it.
The Steamboat Magnolia furnishes a wonderful springboard for teaching
Admiralty as an integrative/crosscutting/comparative/great issues course. It is
an uncommonly rich case to teach and one which demonstrates some of the
fascination in the study of admiralty law, and of law generally. And if my
robust claims for Admiralty are counterintuitive, it may seem even more
improbable that a case with the apparently mundane subject of The Steamboat
Magnolia could deliver so much.
On its face, The Steamboat Magnolia seems to raise the most narrow and
prosaic of topics, whether admiralty jurisdiction can extend to waters beyond
2. Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia (The Steamboat Magnolia), 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296
(1857).
3. See JO DESHA LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 18–19 (Univ. Casebook Ser., 5th ed. 2003).
4. See, e.g., JO DESHA LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 5–30 (Univ. Casebook Ser., 1969); JO DESHA
LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 5–30 (Univ. Casebook Ser., 2d ed. 1978); JO DESHA LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 5–
30 (Univ. Casebook Ser., 3d ed. 1987); JO DESHA LUCAS, ADMIRALTY 4–29 (Univ. Casebook
Ser., 4th ed. 1996).
5. See ROBERT M. JARVIS, DAVID J. BEDERMAN, JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN & STEVEN R.
SWANSON, ADMIRALTY (2004).
6. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh (The Genesee Chief), 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443
(1851); ROBERT M. JARVIS, DAVID J. BEDERMAN, JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN & STEVEN R. SWANSON,
ADMIRALTY 48–53 (2004).
7. See, e.g., NICHOLAS J. HEALY, DAVID J. SHARPE & DAVID B. SHARPE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 14–16, 20–24 (Am. Casebook Ser., 4th ed. 2006) (including a brief
excerpt from Justice Daniel’s dissent as well as The Genesee Chief and other cases); DAVID W.
ROBERTSON, STEVEN F. FRIEDELL & MICHAEL F. STURLEY, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES 11–15 (2d ed. 2001) (using The Genesee Chief). But see 2 ROBERT
FORCE, A.N. YIANNOPOULOS & MARTIN DAVIES, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 3–13 (2008)
(including The Steamboat Magnolia); FRANK L. MARAIST, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR. &
CATHERINE M. MARAIST, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MARITIME LAW (2d ed. 2009) (including
neither case).
8. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 299 (1857) (citing The Genesee Chief,
53 U.S. (12 How.) at 444).
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the ebb and flow of the tide and within the boundaries of a county. So framed,
it is hard to imagine a topic which seems more of a snore. In reality, the case
was a battleground for some of the political and jurisprudential ideas that were
hotly contested in court in the late 1850s and ultimately resolved on the
battlefields a few years later. And it raises a host of questions of much more
general interest which mirror some central debates regarding law which
command continuing interest. What are the appropriate spheres of state and
national control? Of judicial and legislative regulation? Should the
Constitution be interpreted in accordance with the apparent intent of its framers
or to accommodate changing conditions? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of bright line rules and balancing tests? How does social change
influence law? How does legal doctrine serve political ends?
I. THE CASE AND ITS CONTEXT
The case arose from a collision on the Alabama River between the
Steamboat Magnolia and the Steamboat Wetumpka roughly 200 miles above
tidewater.9 The Wetumpka was navigating up-bound on that river between
New Orleans and Montgomery, Alabama; the Magnolia was descending
between Montgomery and Mobile, Alabama.10 The owners of the Wetumpka
filed a libel against the Magnolia in the United States District Court of the
Middle District of Alabama alleging that it had tortuously collided with, and
sunk, their vessel.11 The claimants to the Magnolia moved to dismiss the case
for want of subject matter jurisdiction and the district court granted their
motion.12 Although the reasons for the decision were not stated, presumably it
rested upon the arguments presented to the court, namely that the collision
occurred within the body of the county and above tidewater.13 The owners of
the Wetumpka appealed.14
On the surface, it would be hard to imagine a more bromidic set of issues
than those the Supreme Court considered—whether admiralty jurisdiction
extended to incidents on navigable rivers within counties of states and beyond
tidewaters. The Supreme Court had addressed those issues, in a somewhat
meandering, though by 1857, apparently settled path. In The Steamboat
Thomas Jefferson, the Court, speaking through Justice Joseph Story, had held
that cases involving maritime service contracts fell within admiralty
jurisdiction only if those agreements were to be “substantially performed . . .

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 297.
Id. at 296–97.
Id. at 296, 297.
Id. at 297–98.
The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 298.
Id. at 296.
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upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.”15 Other
decisions by the Marshall and Taney Courts followed this doctrine.16
Although Justice Story had made clear in The Thomas Jefferson that the
tidewater concept limited admiralty jurisdiction, he suggested that Congress
could extend federal jurisdiction to inland rivers through the Commerce
Clause.17 Political pressure built on Congress to expand admiralty jurisdiction
in the 1840s18 and ultimately it apparently followed Story’s suggestion in 1845
when it adopted a statute extending federal jurisdiction to the Great Lakes and
the “navigable waters” connecting to them.19 The statute conferred the same
jurisdiction in contract or tort cases on these waters as the federal courts had in
cases involving vessels “in navigation and commerce upon the high seas, or
tide waters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States.”20 Although Congress did not specifically predicate the Great Lakes
Act on the Commerce Clause, a number of the important framers of the statute
seem to have acted with that power in mind.21
In the mid-1840s, the Court continued to invoke the tidewater test even
when reaching results which demonstrated some imaginative fact-finding.
Most notably, in Waring v. Clarke,22 the Court held that admiralty jurisdiction
extended to a collision between two vessels 95 miles north of New Orleans and
200 miles above the mouth of the Mississippi River.23 The trial court had
found that the tide affected the river where the collision occurred;24 the
Supreme Court held that although the tidewater limit applied, admiralty

15. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). Id. at 428–29.
16. See, e.g., The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175, 182–83 (1837)
(using tidewater test to measure admiralty jurisdiction); Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324,
343 (1833) (applying tidewater test but holding Mississippi River at New Orleans affected by
tide).
17. The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 430.
18. See, e.g., 5 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: THE TANEY
PERIOD 1836–64, at 427–29 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1974) (describing the discontent among ship
owners over the lack of federal jurisdiction on rivers and the Great Lakes and their petitions
asking for federal rather than state jurisdiction).
19. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1873
(1952)).
20. Id. Some suggest Story wrote the statute. See, e.g., SWISHER, supra note 18, at 429,
430, 437; The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 342 (1857) (Campbell, J., dissenting)
(stating Story was reputed to be the author); see id. at 315–16 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (noting that
“a portion of this court” applied pressure to Congress to make changes).
21. SWISHER, supra note 18, at 430–31.
22. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
23. Id. at 451, 464.
24. See id. at 450 (noting the trial court overruled the objection to its jurisdiction thereby
accepting the argument that the tide ebbed and flowed at the point of the collision).
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jurisdiction extended to waters within the body of a county as well as on the
seas.25
The Court considered the constitutionality of the 1845 Act during its 1851
term in The Genesee Chief, a case arising from a collision between a vessel of
that name and the Steamboat Cuba on Lake Ontario.26 The lower federal court
found the Genesee Chief at fault; on appeal, the Supreme Court considered
whether it had subject matter jurisdiction of the case, a decision which turned
on whether the Great Lakes Act was constitutional.27 The Court held that it
was, but not as an exercise of the Commerce power.28 Instead, Chief Justice
Taney wrote an elaborate majority opinion which went beyond the issues the
case presented to vindicate an expansive admiralty jurisdiction.29 Taney
reasoned that Congress did not intend to rest the 1845 Act on the Commerce
Clause since neither its title nor body evidenced such a disposition.30
Moreover, Congress could not constitutionally use the Commerce Clause
simply to confer jurisdiction which was a constitutional concept distinct from
“regulation” of commerce.31
The statute was, however, within the meaning of the Admiralty
Jurisdiction Clause, Taney concluded.32 If the case had raised a question of
first impression, Taney thought it would be easily resolved in favor of the
statute’s constitutionality since the Great Lakes were “inland seas” which
supported interstate and international commerce similar to that on the oceans.33
Limiting admiralty jurisdiction to the Atlantic states offended a structural
principle implicit in the Constitution of “equal rights among all the states.”34
Logic did not dictate confining admiralty jurisdiction based on the ebb and
flow of the tide; such a test was “merely arbitrary, without any foundation in
reason; and, indeed, would seem to be inconsistent with it.”35 If a body was “a
public navigable water, on which commerce is carried on between different

25. Id. at 464.
26. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 450, 451 (1851).
27. Id. at 451.
28. Id. at 458.
29. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 32 n.99
(Univ. Textbook Ser., 2d ed. 1975) (describing case as decided on “unnecessarily broad
grounds”). See also DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM: HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE MARITIME LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 112–19 (Univ. Textbook Ser., 1970) (putting The Genesee Chief in historical
context).
30. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 452.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 453 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 454.
35. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 454.
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States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same.”36 In
England, the tidewater test provided a useful surrogate since tidewater and
navigability were synonyms, and the same logic fit the circumstances when the
Constitution was adopted since all of the states were located on the Atlantic.37
That reasoning explained the result in The Thomas Jefferson and its progeny.
When those decisions were rendered, “the great importance of the question as
it now presents itself could not be foreseen”; accordingly, “the subject did not
therefore receive that deliberate consideration” which it now deserved.38
Applying the tidewater test in 1851 would be “utterly inadmissible,” for it
would arbitrarily preclude admiralty jurisdiction from “thousands of miles of
public navigable water.”39 Moreover, that definition violated the intent of the
founding generation as reflected in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which extended
admiralty jurisdiction to navigable waters within counties as well as on the
high seas.40 The Court would feel bound to follow The Thomas Jefferson if
that case had decided a question of property law upon which others had
relied.41 As a mere jurisdictional decision, it commanded no such respect and
must be overruled to avoid “serious public as well as private inconvenience
and loss.”42 Only Justice Daniel dissented from the Chief Justice’s opinion,
and he did so in a two page opinion, relying primarily instead on his earlier
pronouncements.43 In the next reported case, the Court applied The Genesee
Chief’s dicta to a collision on the Mississippi River and summarily held that
“the constitutional jurisdiction of the United States in admiralty was not
limited by tide-water, but was extended to the lakes and navigable rivers of the
United States.”44
Taney’s opinion for the Court in The Genesee Chief, as extended, would
seem to have resolved the issue. Yet six years later, The Steamboat Magnolia
brought those issues back to the Supreme Court.45 And although the Court
adhered to the principles in Taney’s opinion in The Genesee Chief, this time
the divisions on the Court were more palpable, not only in the 6–3 decision,46
but in the number and intensity of opinions. Four justices felt moved to offer
sometimes lengthy, and in some instances impassioned, opinions. Justice
Grier, who had served on the Court since President James Polk appointed him

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 457.
The Genesee Chief, (12 How.) at 457.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 458–59.
Id. at 463–65 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
Fretz v. Bull, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 466, 468 (1851).
61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857).
Id. at 303.
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in 1846,47 wrote the majority opinion in which six justices joined.48 The
seventy-two-year-old John McLean, a member of the Court since Andrew
Jackson appointed him in 1829,49 filed a concurrence “to be on one or two
points somewhat more explicit” than the Court had been.50 Justice Peter
Daniel, a nominee of President Martin Van Buren,51 dissented,52 as did Justice
John Campbell,53 who, as a nominee of President Franklin Pierce, was the
junior justice.54 Justice John Catron, also a Jackson appointee,55 joined
Campbell’s dissent.56
The intensity of feeling was reflected in the length and tone of the
dissenting opinions. Whereas Grier presented the majority opinion in a little
more than five pages, and McLean added a four-page concurrence,57 Daniel
filed a fifteen-page dissent dripping with Scalia-esque sarcasm, and Campbell
added a twenty-one-page scholarly dissertation.58 Campbell’s closing lines
revealed the stakes he perceived in the case and exposed the depth of his
feeling. He wrote:
I consider that the present case carries the jurisdiction to an incalculable extent
beyond any other, and all others, that have heretofore been pronounced, and

47. Frank Otto Gatell, Robert C. Grier, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 434, 436
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., rev. ed. 1997).
48. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 297.
49. Frank Otto Gatell, John McLean, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 300, 305
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., rev. ed. 1997).
50. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 303 (McLean, J., concurring).
51. Van Buren nominated Daniel a week before leaving office. JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE
DANIEL DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V. DANIEL, 1784–1860, at 154–55, 160 (1964).
He was confirmed on March 2, 1841, a little more than a day before William Henry Harrison took
the oath of office. Id.
52. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 307 (Daniel, J., dissenting). During his
nineteen years on the Court, Daniel never wrote a majority opinion on an admiralty case, almost
invariably concluding that admiralty jurisdiction was lacking. See FRANK, supra note 51, at 182.
As Graydon Staring observed, Daniel “fought a losing campaign of vehement dissents . . . to
retain the English restriction to tidewater in both tort and contract cases, even seven years after
the issue had been conclusively decided otherwise in The Genesee Chief.” Graydon S. Staring,
The Admiralty Jurisdiction of Torts and Crimes and the Failed Search for its Purposes, 38 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 433, 457–58 (2007).
53. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 322 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
54. William Gillette, John A. Campbell, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 47, at 462, 464. Campbell later became one of six former justices to argue before the Court
after serving on it. See Charles T. Fenn, Note, Supreme Court Justices: Arguing Before the Court
After Resigning From the Bench, 84 GEO. L.J. 2473, 2473–74 (1996).
55. Frank Otto Gatell, John Catron, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note
49, at 371, 378.
56. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 303.
57. Id. at 303–07 (McLean, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 307–22 (Daniel, J., dissenting); Id. at 322–43 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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that it must create a revolution in the admiralty administration of the courts of
the United States; that the change will produce heart-burning and discontent,
and involve collisions with State Legislatures and State jurisdictions. And,
finally, it is a violation of the rights reserved in the Constitution of the United
59
States to the States and the people.

The contemporary observer cannot help but be perplexed that
notwithstanding Taney’s opinion in The Genesee Chief, constitutional issues
regarding the tidewater test percolated again to the Court six years later. In
part, the return was due to counsel’s claim that even if the Constitution allowed
admiralty jurisdiction to extend beyond the tidewater, neither the Constitution
nor Congress in the 1789 act had so extended it.60 Moreover, the incongruity
may rest in part on the different American legal culture, which existed in the
1850s than that familiar to us now. Daniel Hulsebosch points out that judicial
precedent, though important then, did not have the dominant status among
sources of law that it later achieved following the advent of the case method by
Christopher Columbus Langdell after the Civil War.61 In any event, the return
of the issue six years later, and the passions it aroused as reflected in the
opinions, suggested something more was at stake than the simple issue
ostensibly before the Court.
II. THEMES AND TEACHING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE STEAMBOAT MAGNOLIA
The issues upon which the outcome in The Steamboat Magnolia pivoted
become anything but banal once the consequences of the dispute and the
underlying jurisprudential assumptions are exposed. Moreover, the case raises
enduring issues in law, which recur in admiralty and elsewhere. Although
Taney’s opinion in The Genesee Chief provided much of the basis for what
Justices Grier and McLean wrote, the presence of two lengthy and impassioned
dissents in The Steamboat Magnolia, compared to Justice Daniel’s terse protest
in the earlier case, makes The Steamboat Magnolia, in my view, the superior
teaching vehicle. The remainder of this essay identifies some of the themes
that the case may helpfully be used to suggest.
A.

Purposive vs. Positivistic Visions of Law

The clash between Justices Grier and McLean on the one hand, and
Justices Daniel and Campbell on the other, turned on their different visions of
the nature of law. Grier and McLean thought law needed to be shaped in
accordance with its underlying purposes. Although Grier made this argument
succinctly by relying on language from the Court’s decision in The Genesee
59. Id. at 342–43 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
60. ROBERTSON, supra note 29, at 116–17.
61. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: “Navigability” and the Transformation of the
Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1063–64 (2002).
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Chief,62 McLean emphasized it in his concurring opinion. In England, he
wrote, the ebb and flow of the tide was synonymous with navigability, and that
rule had been applied initially in the United States, where navigability of the
rivers which flowed into the Atlantic were similarly constrained.63 Yet the
tidewater rule had also been applied to America’s western rivers, as judges
deferred to “an established rule where the reason or necessity on which it was
founded fails.”64 The rule made sense in England, and in the Atlantic states
where “the ebb and flow of the tide marked the extent of the navigableness of
rivers.”65 Inasmuch as “the navigability of our Western rivers in no instance
depends upon the tide,” the rule was applied unreasonably in that new
context.66
The dissenters proceeded from a different premise. They understood law
in more positivistic terms.67 Law was law, whether reasonable or not. Justice
Daniel, for instance, pointed to venerable English laws, which excluded
admiralty jurisdiction from the “realm” or within “the bodies of the counties,”
and confined it to waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide.68 That was
62. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 299 (“In the case of the Genesee Chief,
we have decided, that though in England the flux and reflux of the tide was a sound and
reasonable test of a navigable river, because on that island tide-water and navigable water were
synonymous terms, yet that ‘there is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide that makes
the waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything in the absence of a tide that
renders it unfit. If it is a public navigable water on which commerce is carried on between
different States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same. And if a
distinction is made on that account, it is merely arbitrary, without any foundation in reason—and,
indeed, contrary to it.’”) (internal citation omitted).
63. Id. at 303 (McLean, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 300–02 (majority opinion); see also id. at 303–05 (McLean, J., concurring). See
also The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 453–54 (1851) (“If the meaning of these terms
was now for the first time brought before this court for consideration, there could, we think, be no
hesitation in saying that the lakes and their connecting waters were embraced in them. These
lakes are in truth inland seas. Different States border on them on one side, and a foreign nation
on the other. A great and growing commerce is carried on upon them between different States
and a foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents and hazards that attend commerce on the
ocean. Hostile fleets have encountered on them, and prizes been made; and every reason which
existed for the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the general government on the Atlantic seas,
applies with equal force to the lakes. There is an equal necessity for the instance and for the prize
power of the admiralty court to administer international law, and if the one cannot be established
neither can the other.”); Id. at 456–57 (“But [Waring v. Clarke] showed the unreasonableness of
giving a construction to the Constitution which would measure the jurisdiction of the admiralty
by the tide.”).
67. See The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 308 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (noting
that the court must resist expanding the admiralty jurisdiction as incompatible with our lawful
guarantees and proceeding to examine the previous cases before the court).
68. Id. at 312 (original emphasis omitted).
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the admiralty law “at the period of separation from the American colonies,”
and the “admiralty law of England, according to every accurate test, was the
admiralty law of the United States at the period of the adoption of the
Constitution,”69 a claim Daniel repeated at every opportunity.70 That law had
been followed by the Court’s early precedents.71
Justice Campbell also embraced a similar conception of law. He traced
the development and limitations on admiralty jurisdiction in Great Britain,
which were incorporated in the North American settlements.72 To Campbell,
the appropriate question was “how would a case like that before this court have
been decided in England, either at the period of the Declaration of
Independence, or at the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, in the
court of admiralty?”73 His lengthy analysis makes clear his view that the
jurisdiction the Court recognized in The Steamboat Magnolia was well beyond
constitutional bounds and antithetical to the principles which animated the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
B.

Living Law vs. Originalism

The four opinions present an impassioned dispute regarding the relative
merits of the competing methods of constitutional interpretation. Although the
names of the proponents differ, the arguments resemble those in contemporary
opinions.
In The Genesee Chief, Chief Justice Taney had rejected the tidewater test
based on living constitutionalism premises,74 and the majority opinion rested in
part on the need for law to accommodate changing exigencies. Two
developments in particular made the tidewater test obsolete. America had
expanded geographically to include the network of inland rivers.75 Moreover,
technological advances, principally the invention of the steamship, made
commercial navigation on those rivers possible and advantageous.76
69. Id. at 312–13.
70. See, e.g., id. at 313 (“Under such a state of the admiralty law, conceded to be the law of
England, and as I contend, the law of the United States, . . .”).
71. Id. at 313–15.
72. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 323–27 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 327.
74. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451 (1851) (“The language and decision of this court, whenever
a question of admiralty jurisdiction had come before it, seemed to imply that under the
Constitution of the United States, the jurisdiction was confined to tide-waters. Yet the conviction
that this definition of admiralty powers was narrower than the Constitution contemplated, has
been growing stronger every day with the growing commerce on the lakes and navigable rivers of
the western States.”).
75. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 301.
76. Id. (“When these States were colonies, and for a long time after the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States, the shores of the great lakes of the North, above and beyond the
ocean tides, were as yet almost uninhabited, except by savages. The necessities of commerce and
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Justice McLean espoused a version of the living law. He discounted
concerns that an expanded admiralty jurisdiction in the west would be inimical
to the “wishes and interests” of people in that region by noting its beneficent
execution in the east.77 “Experience is a better rule of judgment than theory,”
he observed, and accordingly the successful use of admiralty in the east
commended its extension.78
Yet his strongest invocation of living law occurred in his concluding
paragraph:
Antiquity has its charms, as it is rarely found in the common walks of
professional life; but it may be doubted whether wisdom is not more frequently
found in experience and the gradual progress of human affairs; and this is
especially the case in all systems of jurisprudence which are matured by the
79
progress of human knowledge.

It was more instructive to study law’s “present adaptations to human concerns,
than to trace it back to its beginnings.”80
Justice Daniel rejected any notion of a living constitution. Judges were not
licensed to interpret the Constitution to accommodate changed circumstances,
a process he characterized as stretching the Constitution “by any application of
judicial torture, to cover any such exigency, either real or supposed.”81 Indeed,
he likened the majority opinion in The Steamboat Magnolia to Chief Justice
Marshall’s statement of living constitutionalism in McCulloch v. Maryland,82
an exposition that has now, of course, achieved canonical status. Daniel
clearly did not appreciate Marshall’s commitment to living constitutionalism in
McCulloch but suggested that the majority’s approach in The Steamboat
Magnolia might be even more egregious.83
Instead, the dissenters insisted that justices were bound to adhere to the
Constitution’s original meaning. Justice Daniel denied that the meaning of the

the progress of steam navigation had not as yet called for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction,
except on the ocean border of the Atlantic States.”).
77. Id. at 305 (McLean, J., concurring).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 307.
80. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 307 (McLean, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 319 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
82. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
83. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 319 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“This
argument forcibly revives the recollection of the interpretation of the phrase ‘necessary and
proper,’ once ingeniously and strenuously wielded to prove that a bank, incorporated with every
faculty and attribute of such an institution, was not in reality, nor was designed to be, a bank; but
was essentially an agent, an indispensable agent, in the administration of the Federal Government.
And with reference to this doctrine of necessity, or propriety, or convenience, it may here be
remarked, that it is as gratuitous and as much out of place with respect to the admiralty
jurisdiction, as it was with respect to the Bank of the United States—perhaps still more so.”).
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Constitution could adapt to changing exigencies.84
Justice Campbell
contended “with perfect safety” that not a single maker or ratifier of the
Constitution would have thought admiralty jurisdiction extended to the case.85
That being so, “no change in the opinion of men, nor in the condition of the
country, nor any apparent expediency, can render that constitutional which
those who made the Constitution did not design to be so.”86 Justice Campbell
supported his originalist methodology with the language from Chief Justice
Taney’s recent majority opinion in Scott v. Sandford:
If any of the provisions of the Constitution are deemed unjust . . . there is a
mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but,
while it remains unaltered, it must be construed as it was understood at the
time of its adoption. It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning,
and delegates the same powers to the Government, and secures the same rights
and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present
form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning with
which it spake when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on
87
and adopted by the people of the United States.

C. Judicial Usurpation of Power
Justices Grier and McLean viewed their opinions as applying reason and
constitutional principles as articulated in The Genesee Chief to changing
circumstances. Justice Daniel, however, regarded the Court’s decision quite
differently. Far from an appropriate effort to accommodate reason and
changed conditions, he characterized the Court’s interpretation as an instance
of judicial overreaching.88 The tidewater limit was consistent with a view of
government “based, in theory at any rate, upon restricted and exactly-defined

84. Id. at 318–19 (“And this inquiry, therefore, forces itself upon us, viz:, if the system was
thus limited, and was known to be so by the framers of the Constitution, and if this instrument
was designed to be applicable to the existing state of things, and was complete in itself, in all its
delegations of and restrictions upon power, where is to be sought the right or power to enlarge or
to diminish the effect or meaning of the instrument to make it commensurate with a predicament
or state of things not merely not existing when the Constitution was framed, but which was not
even within the contemplation of those by whom it was created? Such a power could not exist in
the legislature, the only branch of the Government on which anything like a faculty to originate
measures was conferred; much less could it be claimed by functionaries who have not, and
rightfully cannot have, any creative faculties, but whose capacities and duties are restricted to an
interpretation of the Constitution and laws as they should have been fairly expounded at the times
of their enactment.”).
85. Id. at 334 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Scott v. Sandford (The Dred Scott Case), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426
(1857)).
88. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 307–08 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
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delegations of power only,”89 he claimed. The Genesee Chief, which six years
earlier had rejected the tidewater test, was “more remarkable and more
startling as an assumption of judicial power than any which the judicial history
of the country has hitherto disclosed, prior to the case now under
consideration.”90 Its decisions were “the most startling and dangerous
innovations, anterior to that decision, ever attempted upon the powers and
rights of internal government appertaining to the States.”91
The Court’s abandonment of the tidewater test, Justice Daniel insisted,
constituted a usurpation of power.92 That test was part of the original
understanding. If changed circumstances made it obsolete, the remedy was to
amend the Constitution, not to cure the defect through judicial interpretation.93
89. Id. at 315.
90. Id. at 312.
91. Id. at 317.
92. Id. at 307–08.
93. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 317–19 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“If the
experience of a pretty long official life had not familiarized me with instances, unhappily not a
few, in which the meaning and objects of the Constitution and the just influence of the actually
surrounding condition of the country when that instrument was framed have been lost sight of or
made to yield to some prevailing vogue of the times, I confess that some surprise would have
been felt at the seeming forgetfulness of the court in giving utterance to the expressions above
quoted, of the facts, that when the Constitution was adopted, there was no such navigation as that
on the Mississippi then known—no such river was then possessed by the United States; that the
Constitution was formed by, and for, a coexisting political and civil association; was designed to
be adapted to that state of things; and was in itself complete, and fully adapted to the ends and
subjects to which it was intended to be applied. And but for the reason or the examples above
referred to, the greater surprise would have been awakened by the disregard manifested, in the
reasoning of the court, to this great fundamental principle of republican government, that if the
Constitution was, at the period of its adoption, or has since, by the mutations of time and events,
become inadequate to accomplish the objects of its creation, it belongs exclusively to those who
formed it, and in whom resides the right to alter or abolished, to remedy its defects. No such
power can exist with those who are the creatures of the Constitution, clothed with the humbler
office of executing the provisions of that instrument. Suppose, at the time of its adoption, the
Constitution was universally believed to be defective, in many respects essentially defective,
would such a conviction have rendered it less the Constitution? Would it have lessened in any
degree the obligation of obedience to it, or changed the power whence a remedy for its defects
was to be derived? Could the judiciary, without usurpation, have essayed such a remedy? It is
conceded by the court, that at the time of forming the Constitution the admiralty jurisprudence of
England was the only system known and practiced in this country; it is admitted, also, that the
English system was limited in theory and practice to the ebb and flow of the tide. It is further
admitted, that at the time the Constitution was adopted, and our courts of admiralty went into
operation, the definition which had been adopted in England was equally proper here. These
admissions form a virtual surrender of anything like a foundation on which the decision of the
court could be rested, either in the case of the Genesee Chief or in this case depending on that
alone. For, if it be admitted that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution the admiralty rule
in England limited the jurisdiction to tide-waters, and that the same rule was adopted and was
proper here, it follows, by inevitable induction, that the jurisdiction intended to be created by the
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Justice Daniel made manifest the intensity of his feeling by repetition of the
point and the Scalia-like sarcasm that colored his expression.94
D. Bright Line Rules vs. Principles
The opinions also presented a contest between formalism and
functionalism. Justice Daniel viewed the Constitution as prescribing bright
line rules to limit governmental power.95 He argued that the tidewater and
county rules provided clear guidance whereas navigability, the test the majority
followed, was “vague and arbitrary, and tending inevitably to confusion and
conflict” and a standard which would be “a prolific source of uncertainty, of
contestation and expense.”96 He mocked the Court for abandoning these rules

Constitution was that which was the only one then known, and which, in the language of this
court, was then proper here, (as the Constitution cannot be supposed to establish anything
unauthorized or improper,) and necessarily was complete, and adapted to the existing state of
things. And this inquiry, therefore, forces itself upon us, viz: if the system was thus limited, and
was known to be so by the framers of the Constitution, and if this instrument was designed to be
applicable to the existing state of things, and was complete in itself, in all its delegations of and
restrictions upon power, where is to be sought the right or power to enlarge or to diminish the
effect or meaning of the instrument to make it commensurate with a predicament or state of
things not merely not existing when the Constitution was framed, but which was not even within
the contemplation of those by whom it was created? Such a power could not exist in the
legislature, the only branch of the Government on which anything like a faculty to originate
measures was conferred; much less could it be claimed by functionaries who have not, and
rightfully cannot have, any creative faculties, but whose capacities and duties are restricted to an
interpretation of the Constitution and laws as they should have been fairly expounded at the times
of their enactment.”).
94. See id. at 319 (“Such is the argument of the court, and, correctly interpreted, it amounts
to this: The Constitution, which at its adoption suited perfectly well the situation of the country,
and which then was unquestionably of supreme authority, we now adjudge to have become
unequal to the exigencies of the times; it must therefore be substituted by something more
efficient; and as the people, and the States, and the Federal Legislature, are tardy or delinquent in
making this substitution, the duty or the credit of this beneficent work must be devolved upon the
judiciary.”).
95. See id. at 315 (describing the Constitution as creating a national government based on
“restricted and exactly-defined delegations of power only”).
96. Id. at 320 (“For this plain and rational test, this court now attempts to substitute one in its
nature vague and arbitrary, and tending inevitably to confusion and conflict. It is now affirmed,
that the jurisdiction and powers of the admiralty extend to all waters that are navigable within or
without the territory of a State. In quest of certainty, under this new doctrine, the inquiry is
naturally suggested, what are navigable waters? Will it be proper to adopt, in the interpretation of
this phrase, an etymological derivation from navis, and to designate, as navigable waters, those
only on whose bosoms-ships and navies can be floated? Shall it embrace waters on which sloops
and shallops, or what are generally termed river craft, can swim; or shall it be extended to any
water on which a batteau or a pirogue can be floated? These are all, at any rate, practicable
waters, navigable in a certain sense. If any point between the extremes just mentioned is to be
taken, there is at once opened a prolific source of uncertainty, of contestation and expense.”).
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“in this age of progress.”97 The majority, of course, thought navigability better
served the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction.98 Rules should not be followed
if their animating reason did not apply.
E.

Federalism

The Steamboat Magnolia brings into clear focus the issues relating to
national versus state power, which dominated discussions in the period before
the Civil War. The debate over the proper scope of admiralty jurisdiction was
a major battleground between those who thought an expanded admiralty
jurisdiction would further national economic development and those who saw
it as an intrusion on state authority.99 As Preble Stolz pointed out, during the
early years of the nineteenth century, “federal admiralty jurisdiction could be
legally conceived as coextensive with federal power over commerce,” and
accordingly cases regarding the admiralty jurisdiction clause potentially
implicated the definition of Congress’s commerce power.100 At a time when
these issues divided the nation as the Civil War approached, The Steamboat
Magnolia recognized a new doctrine which allowed federal judges greater
power to decide cases involving a major aspect of commercial life.
The dissenters saw the expansion of admiralty jurisdiction as an
aggrandizement of the power of the federal government, and one which would
have fateful results. Extension of admiralty jurisdiction would send federalism
cascading down a very slippery slope. Justice Daniel predicted:
Under this new regime, the hand of Federal power may be thrust into
everything, even into a vegetable or fruit basket; and there is no production of
a farm, an orchard, or a garden, on the margin of these watercourses, which is
not liable to be arrested on its way to the next market town by the high
101
admiralty power, . . .

97. Id. at 316 (emphasis omitted).
98. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 302 (majority opinion).
99. See Robert Force, Choice of Law in Admiralty Cases: “National Interests” and the
Admiralty Clause, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1421, 1430 (2001).
100. Preble Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 661, 675
(1963).
101. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 320–21 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“Under
this new regime, the hand of Federal power may be thrust into everything, even into a vegetable
or fruit basket; and there is no production of a farm, an orchard, or a garden, on the margin of
these watercourses, which is not liable to be arrested on its way to the next market town by the
high admiralty power, with all its parade of appendages; and the simple, plain, homely
countryman, who imagined he had some comprehension of his rights, and their remedies under
the cognizance of a justice of the peace, or of a county court, is now, through the instrumentality
of some apt fomenter of trouble, metamorphosed and magnified from a country attorney into a
proctor, to be confounded and put to silence by a learned display from Roccus de Navibus,
Emerigon, or Pardessus, from the Mare Clausum, or from the Trinity Masters, or the Apostles.”).
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Some of the rhetoric in Justice Daniel’s opinion foreshadowed arguments of
subsequent Commerce Clause cases imagining a parade of horribles from the
expansion of federal power.102 Daniel condemned “these claims to an allcontrolling central power,” which were inimical to the preservation of State
government.103
Justice Campbell was equally vociferous in denouncing this perceived
assault on principles of federalism and the deleterious consequences that would
flow from it. A federal judge, “deriving his appointment from an independent
Government” would decide cases based on general maritime law, which states
could not modify.104 The logic of the Court’s decision would subject all cases
involving interstate or intrastate transportation of persons or property to the
jurisdiction of federal courts. Campbell viewed such an outcome as contrary to
basic democratic principles since, in his view, a judge representing a different
sovereign would decide matters based on a law that the people of the state
could not shape.105

102. See, e.g., NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 94–95 (1937)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“Manifestly that view of Congressional power would extend it into
almost every field of human industry. With striking lucidity, fifty years ago, Kidd v. Pearson,
128 U.S. 1, 21, declared: ‘If it be held that the term [commerce with foreign nations and among
the several states] includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be the
subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include
all productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Congress
would be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only
manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining—in
short, every branch of human industry.’”).
103. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 321 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 341 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (“A single judge, deriving his appointment from an independent Government,
administers in that court a code which a Federal judge has described as ‘resting upon the general
principles of maritime law, and that it is not competent to the States, by any local legislation, to
enlarge, or limit, or narrow it.’ (2 Story R., 456.) If the principle of this decree is carried to its
logical extent, all cases arising in the transportation of property or persons from the towns and
landing-places of the different States, to other towns and landing-places, whether in or out of the
State; all cases of tort or damage arising in the navigation of the internal waters, whether
involving the security of persons or title to property, in either; all cases of supply to those
engaged in the navigation, not to enumerate others, will be cognizable in the District Courts of the
United States. If the dogma of judges in regard to the system of laws to be administered prevails,
then this, whole class of cases may be drawn ad aliud examen, and placed under the dominion of
a foreign code, whether they arise among citizens or others. The States are deprived of the power
to mould their own laws in respect of persons and things within their limits, and which are
appropriately subject to their sovereignty. The right of the people to self-government is thus
abridged—abridged to the precise extent, that a judge appointed by another Government may
impose a law, not sanctioned by the representatives or agents of the people, upon the citizens of
the State.”).
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Admiralty vs. Common Law

The case also juxtaposed the claims to admiralty jurisdiction as against
those of common law courts. Justice Daniel, who routinely opposed assertions
of admiralty jurisdiction, saw The Steamboat Magnolia as the most recent in a
pattern of intruding into the domain of common law courts.106 He decried “the
claims advanced for the admiralty power, in its constant attempts at
encroachment upon the principles and genius of the common law, and of our
republican and peculiar institutions, . . .”107 Daniel’s point signals the
existence of a jury/nonjury tension associated with the existence of admiralty
courts in addition to the federalism vector.
G. Equal Treatment
The majority defended its result, in part, based on the argument that it
would vindicate a basic principle of the Constitution, conferring “perfect
equality in the rights and privileges of the citizens of the different States, not
only in the laws of the General Government, but in the mode of administering
them.”108 It would violate one of the “first principles” of the Union to make
admiralty jurisdiction along the eastern seaboard but not to the inland states
adjacent to the inland rivers.109 The argument was not original to Justice Grier.
In fact, he borrowed heavily from the more elaborate argument Chief Justice
Taney had offered six years earlier in The Genesee Chief.110 Justice Daniel

106. Id. at 311–12 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 311. See also id. at 322 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (“That this court has assumed a
jurisdiction over a case only cognizable at the common law, and triable by a jury.”).
108. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 302 (majority opinion).
109. Id.
110. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 454 (1851) (“Again. The union is formed
upon the basis of equal rights among all the States. Courts of admiralty have been found
necessary in all commercial countries, not only for the safety and convenience of commerce, and
the speedy decision of controversies, where delay would often be ruin, but also to administer the
laws of nations in a season of war, and to determine the validity of captures and questions of prize
or no prize in a judicial proceeding. And it would be contrary to the first principles on which the
Union was formed to confine these rights to the States bordering on the Atlantic, and to the tidewater rivers connected with it, and to deny them to the citizens who border on the lakes, and the
great navigable streams which flow through the western States. Certainly such was not the
intention of the framers of the Constitution; and if such be the construction finally given to it by
this court, it must necessarily produce great public inconvenience, and at the same time fail to
accomplish one of the great objects of the framers of the Constitution: that is, a perfect equality in
the rights and the privileges of the citizens of the different States; not only in the laws of the
general government, but in the mode of administering them. That equality does not exist, if the
commerce on the lakes and on the navigable waters of the West are denied the benefits of the
same courts and the same jurisdiction for its protection which the Constitution secures to the
States bordering on the Atlantic.”).
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dismissed this argument as irrelevant.111 The irony, of course, was that the
Court celebrated this ideal of state equality, which Chief Justice Taney and his
colleagues found in the structure of the Constitution, when, only a year earlier,
the Court had been unable to find any equality principle which could allow an
African American to be a citizen.112
H. The Impact of Changed Circumstance on Law
As previously mentioned, the issue in The Steamboat Magnolia arose due
to two different types of changed circumstances—territorial expansion and
technological change.113 The former added the inland river system of the
western states on which admiralty jurisdiction would not apply under the
tidewater and not-in-the-county tests. The latter brought the steamboat, which
made commercial navigation on the rivers possible as vessels could now
operate commercially into, as well as with, the current. As such, the case
presents an opportunity to explore two recurring themes in law—the way that
demographic and scientific change present new challenges for law and put
pressure on prevailing doctrine.
The dissenters were not eager to embrace this change. On the contrary,
they were anxious to deploy law to preserve a Jeffersonian vision of the
nineteenth century. Daniel’s biographer, John P. Frank, called him a more
loyal adherent to Jeffersonian principles than Jefferson himself, “an
intransigent, indefatigable, stubborn outpost of eighteenth century thought in
nineteenth century United States.”114
I.

Law in Context

Cases in law school are typically arranged and presented based on
conceptual categories. That organization and treatment often hides the
historical context in which cases arise in two respects. Not only may that

111. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 321 (Daniel, J., dissenting) (“Not the
least curious circumstance marking this course, is the assertion, that it produces equality amongst
all the citizens of the United States. Equality it may be, but it is equality of subjection to an
unknown and unlimited discretion, in lieu of allegiance to defined and legitimate authority.”).
112. Scott v. Sandford (The Dred Scott Case), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1856).
113. See generally Milton Conover, Geography and Industry in the Development of Admiralty
and Maritime Jurisdiction, 27 BROOK. L. REV. 273 (1961) (discussing how exploration of
America’s rivers and lakes in the years following the Judiciary Act of 1789 highlighted the
inadequacy of the old English definition and how that inadequacy was compounded by the
growing importance of nagivation with advancements in science and industry). See also Milton
Conover, The Abandonment of the “Tidewater” Concept of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United
States, 38 OR. L. REV. 34, 53 (1958) (calling The Genesee Chief “a bright page in our
jurisprudence in that it demonstrates the ability of the law to adjust to political and economic
growth”).
114. See FRANK, supra note 51, at viii.
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approach obscure the way in which doctrine evolves from case to case over
time, but an arrangement that lifts a case from the era in which it was decided
may imply that topic is a more relevant category than time. Yet history also
has its claims and decisions turn on surrounding societal events, the
composition of the Court, and the other matters the justices are
contemporaneously considering.
The Steamboat Magnolia presents a compelling reminder that law, even
admiralty law, occurs in a larger historical context, which shapes disputes and
decisions. Although students (and their teachers) often seem to assume that
cases exist only in the artifical context of the surrounding pages of the
casebook, history provides a more relevant backdrop. The Steamboat
Magnolia arose only a few years before the Civil War and was decided thirteen
months after Scott v. Sandford, a connection which Justice Campbell’s citation
helps make.115 The jurisprudential debates regarding methods of constitutional
interpretation, federalism, and judicial role become more vivid and
consequential when students locate this collision case in the period in which it
found its way onto the Court’s docket. The events of the era added passion to
the issues over which the justices sparred in The Steamboat Magnolia.
J.

The Role of Mistake in Shaping Law

Law, even good law, sometimes rests on mistaken assumptions. That was
certainly true in The Steamboat Magnolia.
Even recognizing the difficulty of attributing intent to a legislative body,
Taney’s argument that the Great Lakes Act rested on the Admiralty
Jurisdiction Clause, not the Commerce Clause, seems dubious.116 Recognizing
an expanded Commerce Clause presented perils, particularly to those
concerned that Congress might use a more robust Commerce Clause to
regulate or prohibit slave trade.117 Resting the Act on a jurisdictional clause
seemed less likely to court that perceived danger.118
Moreover, the assumption that the tidewater test in England was a
surrogate for navigability was wrong. On the contrary, English jurists did not
view the two terms as synonyms119 nor did all early American authorities.120
115. 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 334 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
116. See SWISHER, supra note 18, at 430–31 (noting that Story did not indicate which clause
supported the bill and did not specifically identify the Admiralty Clause as a source of authority);
Hulsebosch, supra note 61, at 1099. Cf. ROBERTSON, supra note 29, at 113 (suggesting the
possibility of invoking federal question jurisdiction).
117. Hulsebosch, supra note 61, at 1099.
118. Id. at 1099, 1104–05; Stolz, supra note 100, at 682.
119. Hulsebosch, supra note 61, at 1079.
120. Id. at 1082. Chancellor Kent did equate them and his influence explained why many
American lawyers erroneously thought tidal and navigable were equivalent terms in England. Id.
at 1083–84, 1090.
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Ultimately, the precarious quality of some of its foundation does not
undermine the contribution made by the opinions of Grier and McLean in The
Steamboat Magnolia and of Taney in The Genesee Chief. They believed that
rules should be applied in harmony with their purposes. And they established
a more comprehensive admiralty jurisdiction, which could handle disputes on
the inland rivers and lakes as well as the oceans.
CONCLUSION
The Steamboat Magnolia put to rest judicial controversy over whether
admiralty jurisdiction extended beyond the ebb and flow of the tide and within
the bounds of a county.121 Yet many of the issues its opinions considered,
explicitly or implicitly, continue to dominate discussions of law more than a
century and a half later. Modern discussions over the propriety and scope of
federal common law, in admiralty as well as elsewhere, were foreshadowed
there.122 So were issues which have larger import, such as whether the
Constitution should be viewed as “living” or based on the intent of its framers,
whether rules are preferable to balancing tests, and whether it is more
important that law be certain or reasoned.
The Steamboat Magnolia thus illustrates that Admiralty is not simply
about passing agreements, perils of the sea, and the ebb and flow of the tide. It
is also about federalism, separation of powers, theories of constitutional
interpretation, and larger jurisprudential and legal process issues relating to the
very nature of law. It presents these issues through opinions which rest on
premises and which advance competing visions. The Steamboat Magnolia
alerts the admiralty student that he or she is about to navigate on an exciting
journey.
That’s why I begin my admiralty journey with The Steamboat Magnolia.

121. David J. Bederman, Admiralty Jurisdiction, 31 J. MAR. L. & COM. 189, 194 (2000)
(“Not even today’s most vociferous critics of admiralty jurisdiction can find fault in this
momentous decision.”).
122. See, e.g., Robert Force, An Essay on Federal Common Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 1367, 1368 (1999).

